LAST EDITED ON Sep-10-01 AT 08:36 AM (CDT)I guess we have rumors flying all over the place, so I have to dispel this one. First off:
There is nothing wrong with the designs of Randy Smith. I will say this again on another post, but if his designs are followed to the letter and building practices followed as he outlines above, and proper materials are used and glue joints done properly, there should be no problems whatsoever with his designs. (We can add our own flaws. But it is not the designer, then, who is at fault.) Structurally Randy's designs are more than sufficient. Aerodynamically, they are excellent. However, flawed materials can slip past us, our glue joints could fail ( our fault ), anything could happen. And if a catastrophic failure like this does happen, we need to look for the cause (if we ever do determine it for sure). I in no way have ever or would ever place any of the blame on the structural design of Randy Smith's planes.
That said, Matt's '97 ship--totally different from this one--did have the center section of the wing cut away to clear the tank. This had additional structure added to the center section, however, and has experienced no sign of failure.
Matt's White Stuka was built using the aerodynamics and general building practices of one of Randy Smith's designs. (Thanks, Randy.) He couldn't help himself, however, and he had to make it look like a Stuka. (Sorry, Randy.) The ship flew beautifully, and the next ship is being built on the same aerodynamics. As Bob Hunt advised at the FAI trials (before the "incident") "I wouldn't change a thing. There is nothing wrong with the plane." (There will be a few minor "tweaks", but these have to do with Matt's modifications, and have nothing to do with Randy's design.)
Now, on the ship that did fail, Matt just e-mailed me and I found out something I did not know before. He did have a cut out in the leading edge of the wing similar to the .97 ship but not going as deep. This being his first pipe ship, and not knowing what he was going to need, he was trying to prepare for all contingencies and made room for a 7 ounce tank that was never needed. This cut out will not be placed in the new plane, nor will it be in the new wing that will be fitted to the failed plane when it is eventually rebuilt. However, there was carbon fiber mat placed around the leading edge to fuselage joint to reinforce this area and prevent the "stress cracks" that so often occur. There was no sign of stressing in this area prior to the final flight, and this carbon fiber was pulled from the fuselage when the wing failed pulling strands of wood with it. I don't believe that this, of itself, was the cause of the failure.
I will add that, yes, there was "raw" wood was on the top sheeting. Matt covered the wing after it was attached to the fuselage and did not bring the covering all the way to and overlapping at the center, nor did he glass the center as Randy says is his practice. The intent on the next wing(s) is to glass the center out beyond the fuselage with light fiberglass prior to covering it. Little things, but each will add a little additional strength.
Yes, Matt did use CA on some of the joints, and this, as I will mention in a moment, could have contributed to the failure. Furthermore, there was no fuel soaking contributing to the failure. There was no thinning of the sheeting due to excess sanding. There was a 1/8 x 3/8 main spar, tapering to 1/8 at the tip that was covered top and bottom with .007 carbon fiber. There was a 6 inch long sub spar 1 to 2 inches behind the main spar that was 6 inches long which, therefore, extended out beyond the fuselage. This was, also, covered top and bottom with carbon fiber.
There was some separation of the carbon fiber from the spar due to the crash, but it has wood strands attached to it, which means the glue joints held.
The main spar was spliced with a 1/8 x 3/8 inch balsa splice in the center section and also reinforced by the belcrank mount. The plane passed the pull test and the controls were solid through the turn to inverted in the wingover, which leads me to believe there was no internal failure of the belcrank mount or the controls up to the point that the wing folded.
It was about a week or so before the Nats that Matt heard a "pop" during one of his practice flights. He was not sure whether it came from the engine or from the plane. (There were a few backfire pops in the pipe at the FAI trials as those who were there may remember.) Matt noticed a crack in the silkspan under the pipe in the center section by the leading edge of the bottom of the wing shortly after this. At the time, he thought this may have been the result of the pop that the heard. He peeled the silkspan away and covered that area with fiberglass. Neither that area, nor any portion of the center sheeting above it failed as could be observed after the crash. The silkspan and very top of the center sheeting in the pipe tunnel is also intact (leaving the entire pipe tunnel intact) after the crash. So there was no crack here that led to failure. Also, a thought that we both had that the open fuselage bottom might have contributed to the failure has now been discounted. That area is solid.
In reexamining the plane, it does appear now that the glue joint on the splice on the top spar may have failed and that this, then, contributed to, or caused the catastrophic failure in its final flight. It is possible that this was the "pop" that Matt heard prior to the Nats. Maybe not. But in reexamining the plane, the top spar remains intact with the splice having separated fairly cleanly. The sheeting on the top of the wing, also, sheared fairly cleanly at the fuselage. The bottom spar is crushed in several places and the sheeting buckled internally. All of this is consistent with the way the wing folded and leads to this possible conclusion: The total construction methods used were adequate and could possibly have permitted several thousands of hours of flying except for the failure of the glue joint on the top spar. If the top spar splice joint failed, and it appears now that this could be the case, the wing was weakened to the point that the repeated stress of violent outside corners finally led to the ultimate catastrophic failure. If the separation of the spar joint occurred a week prior to the Nats, which, also, appears possible, then the plane survived several hundred more flights before experiencing the catastrophic failure that prematurely ended its life. This leads to my conclusion that the structure was adequately built had the glue joint not failed (if, indeed, that was the cause.).
So, maybe Ted's suggestion of covering the wing prior to installing it in the fuselage would have helped. Either this or fiberglassing the center section of the fuselage would appear to be good practice and will be followed in the future. The use of epoxy in structural areas where there is either a lot of vibration or flex is probably, also, a good idea. We already use epoxy to glue in motor mounts. Using epoxy or even white or yellow glue in spar joints and braces is probably a better idea than CA as these glues are probably better able to flex under loads which could lead to CA's failure.
We must remember that it is all a total package, and the plane is never stronger than its weakest link. We, also, need to remember, that Matt's plane had over 1000 flights on it over a two year span. He put over 25 gallons of fuel through it this year alone. The failure did not happen in one flight or one month or one year . But there was no way of telling that this was going to be its final flight. It didn't show its age. There were no external stress cracks. There were no "funnies" going on.
Wouldn't it be nice if we could just go back and replace the wood in the center section and see if that does the trick? Or maybe replace the glue. Or cover it differently. Or...
But we can't. So the point is, we just need to review our construction procedures, double check our wood and glue selections, and see where we can make improvements. If we, ourselves, introduce a design flaw, we need to correct it. We can learn. We can share ideas. And we can hope that we never witness this happening again.
(Let's see, how many flyers has this happened to? Shall we line up and raise our hands?)
Leonard Neumann